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Abstract: Using a ¯rm-level dataset this paper investigates the impact of
taxation on the decision of German multinationals to hold direct investments
in other European countries or abroad. Controlling for ¯rm-speci¯c di®erences
in the valuation of potential locations, the results con¯rm signi¯cant e®ects of
tax incentives, market size, and of labor cost on cross-border location decisions.
In accordance with Devereux and Gri±th (1998) we ¯nd that the marginal tax
rate has no predictive power for location decisions whereas e®ective average
and statutory tax rates exert signi¯cant e®ects. In particular, the statutory
tax rate has strong predictive power for the likelihood of direct investment
holdings at a location. The results indicate that an increase in the statutory
tax rate by 10 percentage points reduces the odds of observing some positive
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Initiated by the study of Hartman (1984) several empirical studies have in-
vestigated the in°uence of taxes on cross-border investments of multinational
¯rms. However, in most studies the focus is on the level of investment and its
distribution rather than on the underlying location decisions. An exception
is the seminal contribution by Devereux and Gri±th (1998) who establish the
signi¯cance of the e®ective average tax rate for the choice of location of sub-
sidiaries within Europe using ¯rm-level data for U.S. enterprises. The scarcity
of evidence on the impact of taxation on location decisions might be due to
the fact that the corresponding analysis cannot be done using aggregate FDI
data, but requires data on individual cross-border investments, which are usu-
ally di±cult to obtain. Only recently the Bundesbank has made available for
research its micro-level dataset for foreign direct investment, which o®ers in-
teresting opportunities to study international location decisions (see Lipponer,
2003, for a description of the dataset). The aim of the current paper is to use
this new and promising dataset in order to study empirically the location de-
cisions of German multinationals. More speci¯cally, the paper investigates the
impact of taxation on the decision of German multinationals to hold a foreign
direct investment at a speci¯c location. Furthermore, as questionnaires among
executives emphasize the signi¯cance of statutory tax rates as compared to
e®ective tax rates (S¿rensen, 1992), the predictive power of alternative indica-
tors of taxing incentives is tested.
Controlling for ¯rm-speci¯c di®erences in the valuation of potential locations,
the results con¯rm signi¯cant e®ects not only of the local tax burden but also
of market size and labor cost on cross-border location decisions. In accordance
with Devereux and Gri±th (1998) the marginal tax rate is shown to have nopredictive power for location decisions whereas e®ective average and statutory
tax rates exert signi¯cant e®ects. In particular, the statutory tax rate has a
strong predictive power for the likelihood of direct investment holdings at a
location. The results indicate that an increase in the statutory tax rate by
10 percentage points reduces the odds of observing some direct investment by
approximately 20 %. With regard to the labor cost variable the estimated
impact suggests that an increase in the labor cost by 10 U.S. $ reduces the
odds of some direct investment by about 30 %.
In order to test whether the more advanced degree of integration within the
EU shows up in an increased sensitivity to tax incentives, separate estimations
have been carried out for the European Union countries. While the results
point to an increased sensitivity of location decisions with regard to market
size and labor cost, however, the tax incentives show e®ects similar to those
in the complete sample.1 Introduction
Initiated by the study of Hartman (1984) several empirical studies have investi-
gated the in°uence of taxes on foreign direct investment (surveys are provided
by Hines, 1997, 1999, and de Mooij and Ederveen, 2003). However, in most
studies the focus is on the volume and distribution of FDI rather than on the
underlying location decisions. One notable exception is Bartik (1985) who
shows that the corporate tax rate has a signi¯cant impact on business location
decisions within the U.S. A more recent study is Devereux and Gri±th (1998)
who establish the signi¯cance of the e®ective average tax rate for the choice of
location of subsidiaries within Europe using ¯rm-level data for U.S. enterprises.
The scarcity of evidence on the impact of taxation on location decisions might
be due to the fact that the corresponding analysis cannot be done using ag-
gregate FDI data, but requires data on individual cross-border direct invest-
ments, which are usually di±cult to obtain. Only recently the Bundesbank
has made available for research its micro-level dataset for foreign direct invest-
ment, which o®ers interesting opportunities to study international location
decisions (see Lipponer, 2003). The aim of this paper is to use this new and
promising dataset in order to study empirically the location decisions of Ger-
man multinationals. More speci¯cally, the paper investigates the impact of
taxation on the decision of German multinationals to hold a direct investment
at a speci¯c foreign location. Furthermore, as questionnaires among executives
emphasize the signi¯cance of statutory tax rates as compared to e®ective tax
rates (e.g., S¿rensen, 1992), the predictive power of alternative indicators of
taxing incentives is tested.
Exploiting the panel-data features of the dataset in order to control for ¯rm-
1speci¯c di®erences in the valuation of potential locations, the results con¯rm
signi¯cant e®ects of labor cost, market size, and tax incentives on international
cross-border location decisions. In accordance with Devereux and Gri±th
(1998) we ¯nd that the marginal tax rate has no predictive power for location
decisions whereas e®ective average and statutory tax rates exert strong e®ects.
The next section lays out the investigation approach. This is followed by
a short description of the data set. Another section presents the empirical
results, before a ¯nal section draws some conclusions.
2 Investigation Approach
Consider the location decision for the a±liate of a German multinational in-
dexed by k. With some positive probability pi;k this a±liate will be placed at
location i. In the standard view of tax competition location choice is regarded
as an increasing function of expected pro¯ts, which in turn are determined by
taxes ¿i and other local conditions xi. If the choice set is large this can be
formalized as
pi;k = f (¼k (¿i;xi));
where xi is a vector of local characteristics and ¼k represents expected pro¯ts
in the view of ¯rm k. The current investigation basically employs a sample of
multinationals in order to estimate a linearized version of this relationship
pi;k = yk® + ¿i¯ + °i + xi± + ²i;k;
where ²i;k is a residual variable. Note that in this simple speci¯cation ¯rm-
speci¯c e®ects, as captured by yk®, are assumed to be orthogonal to the loca-
2tion characteristics, as captured by ¿i¯ + °i + xi±. However, despite this sim-
pli¯cation, the pure cross-sectional tax e®ect ¯ is basically unidenti¯ed since
the impact of taxes and of known characteristics xi is already encompassed
by the location-speci¯c or country e®ects °i. But, if one is willing to assume
that unobserved local determinants of location choice are time-invariant, and
if there is some variation in tax incentives over time, a possible solution is to
pool observations for di®erent periods and to estimate the tax equation using
panel data. Accordingly, the empirical analysis might be concerned with the
relationship
pi;k;t = yk® + ¿i;t¯ + °i + xi;t± + Át + ²i;k;t; (1)
where Át is a time-speci¯c e®ect. Note that the panel data structure considered
here is the pooling of investment decisions across countries and time. Given the
assumption that ¯rm e®ects are orthogonal to location as well as time e®ects,
in this setting the presence of ¯rm-level panel data only helps to control for
some di®erences between companies and to solve aggregation problems but not
to discriminate taxation e®ects from unknown location characteristics.
However, given the availability of ¯rm-level panel data, the assumption that
¯rm e®ects are orthogonal to location e®ects is overly restrictive. An alter-
native approach would allow for ¯rm-speci¯c location e®ects. Intuitively, this
approach would assume that each ¯rm has some idiosyncratic valuation of lo-
cations. Identi¯cation of tax and other locational characteristics is then only
possible using the variation of those characteristics over time within each ¯rm-
location cell. Formally, estimation would then require to allow for a full set of
3¯rm-location or ¯rm-country e®ects °i;k
pi;k;t = yk® + ¿i;t¯ + °i;k + xi;t± + Át + ²i;k;t: (2)
In principle, standard panel data estimation techniques might be used to esti-
mate this relationship. But, the inclusion of individual e®ects is not straight-
forward in the current setting due to the binary nature of the observed de-
pendent variable (¯rm k either holds an investment at i or not). Some ¯rms
will hold an investment at a speci¯c location during all periods; other ¯rms
will not hold an investment at this location in any period. Thus, ¯rm-speci¯c
location e®ects will perfectly predict the outcome in these two cases. As a
consequence, appropriate estimators such as the ¯xed-e®ects logit approach
proposed by Chamberlain (1984) focus on a ¯rm's investment in a country
only if we observe some changes in location decisions over time.
3 Dataset
The empirical analysis basically uses the micro database for FDI provided
by the German Bundesbank. This is a comprehensive annual database of
direct investment positions of German enterprises held abroad as well as of
direct investment positions held in Germany by foreign companies. A favorable
characteristic of the dataset is the possibility to trace the direct investment
positions of individual ¯rms over time. In its current version, ¯rm-level panel
data are available for the period 1996 to 2001.
The collection of the data is enforced by German law, which determines report-
4ing mandates for certain international transactions.1 With regard to outward
FDI, each German enterprise has to report its foreign assets, provided asset
holdings are above some threshold level. In the year 2000 some 8,500 domes-
tic investors returned reports on their foreign direct investment. In 2000 in
the case of minority participations (greater 10 % and lower 50 %) reporting is
mandatory if the balance sheet total of the direct investment exceeds 5 million
euros; in the case of majority participations, direct investments have to be
reported if their balance sheet total is above 0.5 million euro. The database
also contains indirect FDI relations, which must be reported if a direct invest-
ment enterprise held by a majority participation holds 10% or more of another
enterprise.
A problem with the data is that threshold levels vary over time (see Lipponer,
2003). More speci¯cally, as compared to the year 2000 in the considered time
period they tend to be lower in previous years. In order to make sure that the
results are not subject to some bias originating in the resulting panel attrition,
the current study consistently employs a uniform threshold level at which
observations are included in the sample. Hence, direct investments are only
included if the current investment position is above the threshold following the
de¯nition for the year 2000.2
Tax incentives are captured by statutory, e®ective marginal, and e®ective av-
erage tax rates on investment in the corporate sector of the host country taken
from Devereux, Gri±th, and Klemm (2002). Note that Germany usually ex-
empts earnings of German a±liates abroad. Hence, the tax burden at the
location of the a±liate is decisive from the point of view of German com-
1x 26 Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz (Law on Foreign Trade and Payments) in connection with Aussen-
wirtschaftsverordnung (Foreign Trade and Payment Regulations).
2While the uniformity of threshold levels across years proved important, note that variations in the de¯nition
of the threshold level have been found to have only minor e®ects on the estimation results.
5panies. Given the short time period of the analysis most of other potential
location characteristics are probably captured by country e®ects. However,
presumably time-variant location conditions such as market sizes and labor
cost are captured by OECD data on GDP and hourly labor cost as provided
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics at the U.S. Department of Labor.
For our purposes we exclude FDI in the ¯nancial sector, since we are basically
interested in the tax e®ects on real investment decisions. We also exclude
direct investments, which are made in branches or partnerships, since in such
cases other e®ective or statutory tax rates apply as in the corporate sector.
Table (1) provides descriptive statistics of the dataset. Note that the number
of observations re°ects the whole set of possible locations for each enterprize.
More speci¯cally, for each company in the dataset in a given year there are
15 separate observations indicating whether or not a positive foreign direct
investment is held separately for each of the countries considered.
4 Results
As discussed above the empirical analysis of location decisions involves the esti-
mation of location probabilities depending on location and ¯rm characteristics.
The logarithm of GDP is used as a proxy variable for the size of the foreign
market, the logarithm of hourly compensation of employees in manufacturing is
used as an indicator of labor cost. As it is very di±cult to account for other lo-
cational conditions like public services or agglomeration e®ects we also include
dummy variables for each country in the sample in order to control for un-
observed country characteristics. In order to further reduce the consequences
of heterogeneity in the sample on the results, we include dummy-variables for
6Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Statutory tax rate .347 .084 .100 .532
E®ective marginal tax rate .224 .071 .066 .403
E®ective average tax rate .295 .074 .084 .469
GDP 1304.9 2221.9 70.31 10020
Labor cost in manuf. 16.76 5.21 4.54 27.2
Legal status of mother
Sole proprietor/partnership .185 .388 0 1
Stock corporation (AG, KGaA) .113 .317 0 1
Limited liability corporation (GmbH) .482 .500 0 1
Other corporations .219 .413 0 1
Dependent branches .001 .033 0 1
Locations of foreign direct investment
France .334 .472 0 1
Netherlands .180 .384 0 1
Italy .179 .383 0 1
United Kingdom .235 .424 0 1
Ireland .022 .145 0 1
Greece .023 .149 0 1
Portugal .047 .212 0 1
Spain .169 .374 0 1
Sweden .064 .244 0 1
Finland .022 .148 0 1
Austria .238 .426 0 1
Belgium .118 .322 0 1
USA .326 .469 0 1
Canada .072 .258 0 1
Japan .051 .220 0 1
424635 observations representing the possible holdings of foreign direct investments at 15
di®erent locations for 7423 ¯rms in the period 1996 to 2001.
7Table 2: Linear Probability Model
method OLS OLS OLS
Statutory tax rate -.051 ?
(.025)
Marginal e®. tax rate -.005
(.014)
E®. average tax rate -.032
(.022)
log GDP .027 .015 .024
(.012) (.011) (.011)




R2 .1040 .1040 .1040
Dummies for country, time, and legal status of mother included. Standard er-
rors (in parentheses) robust against heteroscedasticity and random ¯rm e®ects.
A star denotes signi¯cance at the 10 % level.
the legal status of the mother as one of the few available characteristics of
the German investor in the dataset, unless we explicitly allow for individual
¯rm-e®ects in the estimations.
Table (2) shows the results of a basic linear regression of the probability of
holding a direct investment in each of 12 major countries of the European
Union, in the U.S., in Canada or in Japan, on three di®erent tax measures,
namely the e®ective marginal tax rate (EMTR), the e®ective average tax rate
(EATR, calculated at a rate of return of 10 %) and the statutory tax rate
(STR). In order to avoid the Moulton (1990) problem, standard errors are
robust against random ¯rm e®ects using the usual Huber-White sandwich for-
mula. The three indicators of the tax burden show di®erent results. While the
marginal and e®ective average tax rates prove insigni¯cant, the statutory tax
8rate shows a signi¯cant negative impact. However, GDP proves insigni¯cant as
well, and labor cost even show an unexpected positive impact. Quantitatively,
the estimated impact of the statutory tax rate suggests that an increase of the
statutory tax rate by 10 percentage points reduces the probability to observe
a foreign direct investment by about 0.51 percentage points: given an average
sample probability of 0.13 this is a relative reduction by 4 %.
The linear probability model fails to take account of the binary nature of the
dependent variable. Making speci¯c assumptions about the probability distri-
bution of the presence of a direct investment conditional on covariates more
e±cient estimates can be obtained from corresponding non-linear estimators
such as probit or logit. Table 3 provides results. The ¯rst panel reports re-
sults from probit, the second from random-e®ects probit and the third panel
reports results from logit models. All estimates report robust standard errors.
Now, both the statutory as well as the e®ective average tax rate prove sig-
ni¯cant. With regard to the marginal probability e®ects, quantitatively, the
results on the tax rates are quite similar as in the linear model. However,
some estimates con¯rm the unexpected positive coe±cient on the labor cost,
while GDP proves insigni¯cant throughout. While the random e®ects probit
estimation shows somewhat weaker results, the logit estimates yield almost
identical marginal e®ects to the probit model.
Given the strong signi¯cance of GDP and, partly, of labor cost in other studies
of FDI (e.g., Pain, 2003, or Billington, 1999) its insigni¯cance points to the
di±culty to distinguish country characteristics from the country-¯xed e®ects.
However, as suggested above, the ¯rm-level data allow us to take account of
¯rm-speci¯c valuations of the attractiveness of locations by means of ¯rm-
speci¯c country e®ects. As these e®ects would perfectly predict decisions if a
9Table 3: Discrete Probability Models
Probit
Coe±cient Slope Coe±cient Slope Coe±cient Slope
Statutory tax rate -.263 ? -.047 ?
(.109) (.019)
Marginal e®. tax rate -.043 -.008
(.060) (.011)
E®. average tax rate -.187 ? -.033 ?
(.101) (.018)
log GDP .193 ? .034 ? .130 .023 .189 ? .034 ?
(.110) (.020) (.113) (.020) (.114) (.020)
log Labor cost in manuf. .035 .006 .044 .008 .042 .007
(.040) (.007) (.040) (.007) (.040) (.007)
Log-Likelihood -147772 -147773 -147772
Pseudo R2 .1349 .1349 .1349
Dummies for country, time, and legal status of mother included. Standard errors (in paren-
theses) robust against heteroscedasticity and random ¯rm e®ects.
Probit with Random E®ects
Coe±cient Slope Coe±cient Slope Coe±cient Slope
Statutory tax rate -.307 ? -.042 ?
(.162) (.022)
Marginal e®. tax rate -.050 -.007
(.101) (.014)
E®. average tax rate -.220 -.030
(.153) (.021)
log GDP .225 .031 .153 .021 .223 -.030
(.150) (.020) (.155) (.021) (.157) (.021)
log Labor cost in manuf. .041 .006 .050 .007 ? .048 .007 ?
(.050) (.007) (.049) (.007) (.049) (.007)
Log-Likelihood -134408 -134409 -134408
Dummies for country and time included. Standard errors (in parentheses).
Logit
Coe±cient Slope Coe±cient Slope Coe±cient Slope
Statutory tax rate -.482 ? -.042 ?
(.193) (.017)
Marginal e®. tax rate -.108 -.009
(.105) (.009)
E®. average tax rate -.377 ? -.033 ?
(.180) (.016)
log GDP .402 ? .035 ? .301 .026 .421 ? .037 ?
(.222) (.019) (.229) (.020) (.231) (.020)
log Labor cost in manuf. .077 .007 .091 .008 .088 .008 ?
(.073) (.006) (.073) (.006) (.073) (.006)
Log-Likelihood -147872 -147874 -147873
Pseudo R2 .1343 .1343 .1343
Dummies for country, time, and legal status of mother included. Standard errors (in paren-
theses) robust against heteroscedasticity and random ¯rm e®ects.
10Table 4: Linear Probability Model with Firm-Speci¯c Country E®ects
method OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE
Statutory tax rate -.479 ?
(.187)
Marginal e®. tax rate -.019
(.118)
E®. average tax rate -.301 ?
(.177)
log GDP .339 ? .175 .315
(.188) (.193) (.196)
log Labor cost in manuf. -.125 ? -.111 ? -.113 ?
(.059) (.058) (.059)
Firm country cells 4789
Obervations 24528
Hausman ¯xed vs. random 40.0 (8) 33.1 (8) 35.8 (8)
Estimation with ¯xed e®ects for each ¯rm-country cell. Time-speci¯c e®ects
included. Standard errors (in parentheses).
¯rm holds a direct investment or does not hold any direct investments during
the whole reporting period at a speci¯c location, we restrict attention to those
observations where a change in the location decision for each ¯rm-country
cell is observed at least once in the period analyzed. Table 4 provides results
from a corresponding linear probability model allowing for ¯rm-speci¯c country
e®ects. Note ¯rst that the number of observations is drastically reduced which
re°ects the removal of all observations where a direct investment position is or
is not observed for a ¯rm in the total time period considered. This is re°ected
in a much higher average sample probability to observe a direct investment of
about 0.51. While statutory and e®ective average tax rates show signi¯cant
negative e®ects the marginal e®ective tax rate, again, proves insigni¯cant. The
GDP now shows signi¯cant positive e®ects and the labor cost variable no longer
shows the unexpected positive sign but shows a signi¯cant negative e®ect.
11Quantitatively, the estimated impact of the statutory tax rate seems much
larger than in the previous estimations suggesting that an increase of the
statutory tax rate by 10 percentage points reduces the probability to observe
a direct investment by about 4.8 percentage points. Given the higher sam-
ple probability to observe a direct investment, the relative reduction in the
probability is about 9.4 % which is roughly twice as large than in the basic
estimations. Also the impact of the e®ective average tax rate is increased: an
increase by 10 percentage points reduces the probability to observe a direct
investment by 5.9 %. Despite of its smaller coe±cient, the standard error of
the e®ective average tax rate is not much smaller, indicating that the estimate
is less precise. However, it has to be noted that the EATR assumes a speci¯c
rate of return, which may not be representative for all location decisions or all
¯rms in general. Thus, the smaller coe±cient is likely indicative of a measure-
ment error problem. With regard to the labor cost the results from the ¯rst
speci¯cation using the statutory tax rate indicate that a doubling of the labor
cost reduces the probability to observe a direct investment by 12.5 percentage
points. Evaluated at the mean level of labor cost in the sample of 16.8 U.S. $
per hour, this indicates that an increase in the labor cost by 10 U.S. $ would
result in a relative reduction of the location probability by about 14.6 %.
Now, the linear probability model neglects the presence of a qualitative de-
pendent variable. Table 5 reports results from the ¯xed-e®ects logit model.
Qualitatively, the results con¯rm the ¯ndings from the linear model. The
signs of the coe±cients are the same, and also the signi¯cance against zero
e®ects is con¯rmed. The interpretation is, however, slightly di®erent, as the
coe±cients report the impact on the log odds ratio. Hence, an increase of the
statutory tax rate by 10 percentage points reduces the odds of an investment
12Table 5: Discrete Probability Model with Firm-Speci¯c Country E®ects
method Logit-FE Logit-FE Logit-FE
Statutory tax rate -1.98 ?
(.764)
Marginal e®. tax rate -.074
(.479)
E®. average tax rate -1.25 ?
(.724)
log GDP 1.41 ? .735 1.31
(.775) (.798) (.809)
log Labor cost in manuf. -.516 ? -.457 ? -.468 ?
(.241) (.240) (.240)
Firm country cells 4789
Obervations 24528
Log-Likelihood -9638 -9641 -9639
Estimation with ¯xed e®ects for each ¯rm-country cell. Time-speci¯c e®ects
included. Standard errors (in parentheses).
by about 20 %. With regard to the labor cost we ¯nd that doubling the labor
cost reduces the odds by about 50 %. In terms of the above example of an
increase in the labor cost by 10 US $ the odds would fall by about 30 %.
The 15 countries selected are quite heterogenous, including EU member states
as well as { from a German perspective { rather distant locations such as
U.S., Canada, and Japan. It seems quite likely that tax incentives and other
locational conditions have a di®erent impact at least for these two subsets of
countries. Table 6 reports results only for the location decision within the EU.
As compared to the estimations for the full sample, while the tax rate e®ects
are similar, the sensitivity with regard to GDP and labor cost is increased.
However, partly re°ecting the smaller sample the standard errors are increased
as well.
13Table 6: Discrete Probability Model with Firm-Speci¯c Country E®ects, EU
countries only
method Logit-FE Logit-FE Logit-FE
Statutory tax rate -1.94 ?
(.793)
Marginal e®. tax rate -.053
(.486)
E®. average tax rate -1.17
(.741)
log GDP 1.54 ? 1.01 1.54 ?
(.890) (.938) (.932)
log Labor cost in manuf. -.785 ? -.706 ? -.735 ?
(.332) (.329) (.330)
Firm country cells 3896
Obervations 19907
Log-Likelihood -7822 -7825 -7824
Estimation with ¯xed e®ects for each ¯rm-country cell. Time-speci¯c e®ects
included. Standard errors (in parentheses).
145 Conclusions
The aim of the paper is to test empirically the in°uence of taxation on the
decision of German multinationals to hold a foreign direct investment at a spe-
ci¯c location. In di®erence to most of the literature this paper uses a ¯rm-level
dataset to study location decisions. While this raises di±culties in combining
data at the ¯rm as well as at the country level, it enhances possibilities to iden-
tify tax incentives relative to other possibly unknown country characteristics.
Furthermore, as questionnaires among executives emphasize the signi¯cance
of statutory tax rates as compared to e®ective tax rates, the predictive power
of alternative indicators of taxing incentives is tested.
The analysis ¯rst of all documents the di±culties to identify tax incentives
and other locational characteristics against simple location or country e®ects.
While supporting an impact of the statutory tax rate, basic regressions yield
mixed and partly unexpected results for control variables such as labor cost
and GDP even if the non-linearities arising from the binary dependent vari-
able are taken into account. Only when allowing for ¯rm-speci¯c valuation of
a country's attractiveness, signi¯cant e®ects can be established not only for
statutory tax rates but also for the e®ective average tax rate, the market size,
as captured by the GDP, and the labor cost. The results indicate that an
increase in the statutory tax rate by 10 percentage points reduces the odds
to observe some positive direct investment by approximately 20 %; for the
e®ective average tax rate the corresponding ¯gure is 12.5 %. With regard to
the labor cost variable the estimated impact suggests that an increase in the
labor cost by 10 U.S. $ per hour reduces the odds of observing an investment
by about 30 %.
15In conditioning on ¯rm-speci¯c country e®ects the sample is, however, con-
siderably reduced and attention is focused on those multinationals which are
revealed to alter their location decisions in the six-year period considered.
Thus, the stronger results for this sub-sample are likely caused by a larger
fraction of footloose industries and, in this respect, may not be representative
for all German multinationals.
In order to test whether the more advanced degree of integration within the
EU shows up in an increased sensitivity to tax incentives, separate estimations
have been carried out for the European Union countries. While the results
point to an increased sensitivity of location decisions with regard to market
size and labor cost, however, the tax incentives show e®ects similar to those
in the complete sample.
Among the di®erent indicators of tax incentives, the statutory tax rate has
the strongest predictive power and yields the strongest e®ects. In contrast,
the marginal e®ective tax rate is not signi¯cant at all. Given the signi¯cance
of the e®ective average tax rate this is in accordance with Devereux and Grif-
¯th (1998) who argue that the e®ective average rather than the marginal tax
rate matters for location decisions. However, one could speculate whether the
weaker predictive power of the e®ective average tax rate as compared to the
statutory tax rate may indicate that uncertainties in the rate of return or in
the applicability of certain deductions lead investors to rely on the statutory
tax rate. But it also could simply re°ect di®erences in the rate of return of
investment projects which might give rise to a measurement error problem.
16Datasources and De¯nitions
Firm-level data are taken from the micro-dataset of the Bundesbank, see
Lipponer (2003) for an overview.
GDP in U.S. Dollars, nominal. Source: OECD.
Hourly compensation of workers: Hourly compensation costs in U.S. Dol-
lars for production workers in manufacturing. Source: U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
Tax incentives are taken from Devereux, Gri±th, and Klemm (2002). The
data are kindly provided by the authors at the IFS website.
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